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Chapter 3 
COLLABORATIVE PLANNING & SUSTAINABILITY: 
EXPLORING ECOSYSTEMS AS COMMON-POOL 
RESOURCES IN THE LOCKYER CATCHMENT 
Krishna K. Shrestha and Ashutosh Sarker 
Conventional approaches to planning and management of natural 
resources based on rational, top-down thinking remains dominant, 
despite a large body of empirical evidence suggesting that such an 
approach has compromised sustainability, often delivering outcomes 
that are ecologically damaging and socially inappropriate. This chapter 
examines the current planning and management of natural resources in 
the Lockyer Catchment in Queensland, Australia, and explores potentials 
for planning and management informed by the concept of ‘commons’ or 
‘common-pool resources’ (CPR), which emphasise bottom-up, 
collaborative planning and management by community groups.  
It is found that the making and implementation of plans by the 
government agencies have simplified the complex interdependence 
between natural and social systems. The implementation of the current 
management plans has led to deterioration of ecological health and 
integrity. Despite an enormous interest in collaborative action by 
stakeholders, the planning and management of ecosystems is inherently 
a political process where government line agencies control the processes 
while other stakeholders are effectively excluded. The CPR approach 
offers theoretical and practical insights to inform collaborative planning 
and management of ecosystems where stakeholders could work together 
as equal partners to identify issues, negotiate solutions, devise plans and 
implement agreed institutional arrangements to enhance sustainability.  
Introduction 
Sustainable planning and management of natural resources has become 
one of the key goals for many government agencies, non-government 
organisations and community groups around the world today. However, 
conventional approaches for planning and management of natural 
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resources, either based on a rational, top-down system or market-based 
privatised approach remains largely dominant in many contemporary 
government policies and practices. A large body of empirical evidence, 
however, suggests that conventional planning and management by 
government agencies or private organisations has often delivered 
unsustainable management outcomes that are ecologically damaging and 
socially inappropriate (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Ostrom, 1990; Sarin 
et al., 2003; Turner, 2004). Frequent calls for rethinking government-
controlled or privatised planning and management are not new, but their 
persistence in policy and practices demonstrates a great deal of defiance. 
A critical analysis of the centralised and privatised natural resource 
planning and management is therefore required.  
A growing body of literature on collaborative planning has heavily 
criticised the top-down, rational comprehensive planning model. 
Advocates of collaborative planning emphasise that two or more 
stakeholders can communicate and learn from each other, and negotiate 
and build consensus to solve problems neither of them can do 
individually (e.g., Forester, 1989; Healey, 2003; Innes, 2004). 
Collaborative planning is increasingly popular in contemporary planning 
theory and practice mainly because of its appeal to enhance democratic 
decision-making and to bring together a range of stakeholders 
fragmented by varying degrees of power and responsibility to solve 
critical problems. Yet, a collaborative approach to decision-making has 
been questioned for its ability to engage with a range of issues relating to 
unequal power relations, and to sufficiently account for a wide range of 
social, economic and political contexts in which planning decisions are 
made (Flyvbjerg, 2002; Hiller, 2003).  
Literature on collaborative planning is surprisingly silent on the linkage 
between collaborative planning and its allied concept of commons or 
common-pool resources (CPR). Moreover, this approach is yet to be 
explored for its relevance and possibility for ecosystem planning and 
management. It is therefore useful to examine the planning and 
management of ecosystems, and explore the potential for sustainable 
planning and management of such ecosystems informed by the concept 
of commons or CPR. 
Ecosystems have become one of the core elements in the shifting 
debates in natural resource planning and management. An ecosystem is 
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usually defined as a natural system consisting of biotic factors (all plants, 
animals and microorganisms) and abiotic factors (all non-living 
components of the environment) which function together in area(s) of 
the physical world. The concept has evolved from referring to a 
relatively simple, closed and static system involving linear relationships 
between biotic and abiotic factors, to sets of complex, open and 
dynamic systems (Nantel et al., 2003). In debates over how to plan and 
manage ecosystems, two common themes emerge – a) that planning and 
management should maintain or improve ecosystems, and b) that 
ecosystems should provide a range of goods and services to a variety of 
stakeholders (Christensen et al., 1996).  
The ecosystem services, which are generated through the complex 
interaction between the environment and living organisms, include a 
range of goods and services that are useful for humans such as 
purification of air, reduction of sediment flow and maintenance of water 
quality (Daily, 1997; MEA, 2005). In the past, understanding of the 
complex and dynamic nature of relationships between biotic and abiotic 
factors was limited, leading to decisions that resulted in unregulated 
access and use of ecosystem services almost as abundant free gifts of 
nature. Over time, this led to a systematic degrading of the quality and 
quantity of ecosystems (such as in the Himalayas, see Ives 1987) due to 
intense population growth (Ehrlich, 1968) and lack of a sustainable 
management approach (Hardin, 1968).  
Three broad approaches have been recommended for the planning and 
management of natural resources. Some scholars argue that the market-
based approach (i.e., privatisation) is the most efficient form of 
ownership, planning and management (e.g., Demsetz, 1967), while 
others argue for a centralised approach (i.e., government ownership and 
control) (e.g., Ophuls, 1973). Yet many other scholars cite examples of 
failed state-planning and management of natural resources to call for a 
return to local, collectively organised planning and management 
approaches (Berkes, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Li, 1996; Ostrom, 2003). Their 
research indicates that centralised or privatised systems fail to account 
for factors which encourage collective action and self-regulating 
capabilities of user groups (Runge, 1986), and that centralised and 
privatised systems often confuse common property with open access, 
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failing to distinguish between common property and no property 
(Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975; McKean, 2000).  
Hence the tragedy of the planning and management of resources results 
not from the sharing of the rights, but the absence of rights. Many 
geographers, political scientists and anthropologists argue that societies 
have devised, maintained or adapted collective arrangements to manage 
CPRs, and therefore, planning and management of natural resources by 
their users can be an appropriate system (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; 
Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Gibson, et al., 2000; Menzies, 
2003; Ostrom et al., 2007). However, the planning and management of 
ecosystems has yet to be considered through the lens of CPRs. Our aim, 
therefore, is to explore potentials for CPR as an alternative approach for 
planning and management of ecosystems to address issues related to 
market failure arising from externalities by examining the centralised and 
privatised planning and management of natural resources. This chapter 
raises three interrelated questions – a) What is the ecosystem health in 
the case study catchment? b) How are ecosystems being planned and 
managed, and why has the centralised system persisted? and c) How do 
stakeholders view collaborative ecosystem planning and management of 
natural resources?  
The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, an overview of the concepts 
of CPR and externality will be provided, followed by a description of 
qualitative and quantitative methods that we have employed to collect 
and analyse direct and indirect data and briefly outline the background 
for the case study – the Lockyer Catchment in Southeast Queensland, 
Australia. The third section presents the findings, focusing on the three 
questions set out above, followed by a critical discussion on why 
centralised planning and management has persisted, and how a 
collaborative approach informed by the concept of CPR could be 
applied to planning and management of natural resources to internalise 
externalities and improve social and ecological outcomes. Finally, we 
conclude by highlighting the potential for the CPR approach to establish 
and foster collaborative planning and management.  
Common-pool resources (CPR) and externality  
A CPR is defined as a natural resource system, often characterised by 
two attributes: a) excludability – it is very difficult to exclude a 
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beneficiary from deriving a benefit from the resource, and b) 
subtractability – once the beneficiary derives the benefit, it becomes 
unavailable to other potential beneficiaries (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 
1999; Ostrom, 2005). The attributes of CPRs are summarised in Figure 
13, which shows the attributes of CPRs such as irrigation and fisheries 
that generate water and fish as resource units respectively. Once a 
certain amount of the resource unit is subtracted, it is no longer available 
to others (i.e., subtractability). It is also difficult to exclude the potential 
users from appropriating the resource units (i.e., excludability).  
Figure 13: Key attributes of common-pool resources 
Source: Ostrom et al. (1994) p. 7 
In a similar way, an ecosystem used by many users tends to share these 
two attributes. The resource unit of an ecosystem is an ecosystem 
service which can be subtracted by the activities that users undertake. 
One example is land clearing by a landholder who subtracts the level of 
ecosystem services (as a result, soil erosion and salinity problems occur) 
for the other landholders. Ecosystem services such as improved water 
quality are utilised by one individual leading to low level of water quality 
available to other users. It is also difficult for some individuals to 
exclude others to restrict access of water quality, since the nature of 
water quality, particularly rivers, creeks or ocean cannot be trapped or 
fenced within a fixed boundary.  
Ecosystem services are unique because the nature of services is complex 
and the services can generate far reaching cross-boundary consequences 
in both temporal and spatial terms. These two characteristics are also the 
Attributes of 
a resource 
Low subtractability of 
benefits 
High subtractability of 
benefits 
Difficult to 
exclude 
beneficiaries 
Public goods 
(e.g. defence, national radio) 
Common-pool resources (CPR) 
(e.g. irrigation systems, forests) 
Easy to 
exclude the 
beneficiaries 
Toll goods 
(e.g. swimming pool) 
Private goods 
(e.g. private farming land) 
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source of problems for the planning and management of ecosystems as 
CPRs. For instance, the difficulty of exclusion can result in over-
exploitation of resources, while the subtractability of resources can lead 
to the degradation or destruction of ecosystems. Two assumptions 
underlie the solutions proposed by CPR theorists. First, societies have 
devised, maintained or adapted collective arrangements to manage CPRs 
(e.g., Gibson et al., 2000). Second, local users are interdependent, and are 
willing and capable of communication, collective action and institutional 
development to solve CPR problems. Yet, CPR solutions tend to focus 
on a group of people who manage natural resources on-site and fail to 
attend to the indirect and off-site effects.  
Such failure may be overcome by employing the concept of externality 
in ecosystem planning and management as CPR. An externality issue 
arises, for instance, when an individual or group undertakes an activity 
that creates costs or benefits for others, but the sufferers are 
compensated and the beneficiaries are not required to pay any extra for 
the increased benefits (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1998; Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 2001). This means a market may not necessarily take the 
externalities into account. In neoclassical economics, failure to 
internalise such external benefits (or losses) is believed to create ‘market 
failure’. Such failures are inherent in ecosystem planning and 
management. In any typical CPR situation, for instance, individuals, 
groups and societies are interdependent, and actions by an individual or 
group to access, use and benefit from ecosystem services affect one 
another, both in temporal and spatial terms. Similarly, physical resources 
such as land, vegetation and water are interdependent: the loss of 
biodiversity in certain parts of ecosystems, for example, will adversely 
affect not only the particular ecosystem and where the loss occurs, but 
also the other parts of the ecosystem. Issues of direct and indirect as well 
as on-site and off-site effects are often termed by economists as 
‘externality issues’.  
Externalities can be classified into two types: within-boundary and cross-
boundary externalities (cf. Quiggin, 2001). A within-boundary externality 
occurs within the periphery of a particular CPR. In the case of the 
groundwater CPR, for example, one user’s water appropriation affects 
the level of appropriation for other users within the specific CPR 
boundary. On the other hand, an externality can be cross-boundary 
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when users of one CPR can impose externalities on another CPR. In 
other words, the effects can cross CPR boundaries. For instance, when a 
large amount of water is withdrawn from a river (surface water CPR) or 
intercepted in the landscape by farm dams, this affects the amount of 
water draining underground to replenish a groundwater CPR, creating a 
cross-boundary externality. The surface water CPR imposes cross-
boundary externalities on the groundwater CPR.  
In the case of a within-boundary externality, however, the action of 
individuals (or groups) affects the other, but it does not always happen 
in a cross-boundary externality. For example, when trees, which have 
some CPR attributes through the ecological benefits they confer to other 
natural resources, are cleared away from hill slopes or river banks, soil 
erosion and unwanted nutrient flow occur and deteriorate the water 
quality of streams and rivers. This type of cross-boundary externality is 
uni-directional in that the decreasing water quality does not in turn 
enhance soil erosion and nutrient flows. The uni-directional, cross-
boundary externality within one catchment may even cross the 
catchment boundary to impose further externalities downstream. It is 
therefore important to carefully account for externalities as well as 
relationships between different externalities so as to understand the 
effects on planning and management of ecosystems as CPR.  
Research method 
This study employs a mixed method using an in-depth case study as a 
research strategy. The case study offers a method of learning about a 
complex instance through extensive description and contextual analysis 
(Yin, 2002). It is a valuable method for identifying, linking and 
comparing issues of resource management (Howitt, 2001). Primary data 
were collected by combining qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Qualitative methods include field visits and observation of various sites, 
as well as interviews, discussions and participant observation involving 
government officials (state and local council levels), landholders, 
community groups and researchers from universities and Healthy 
Waterways. Quantitative method involves the analysis of survey data 
collected from published materials. Qualitative and quantitative methods 
and analysis were employed in such a way that they complemented each 
other in that the data collected from one method were checked and 
  
 51
verified by the data collected from another method so as to increase 
research validity and rigour. Secondary data were collected from various 
publications, and were also checked with research participants. In the 
Brisbane River and Moreton Bay area, participation focused on the 
activities of the Healthy Waterways Partnership because of its long-term 
involvement in previous studies in environmental management.  
The Lockyer Catchment 
The case study area is the Lockyer Catchment in South East Queensland 
(SEQ) Australia. The catchment is characterised by extensive historical 
land clearing which has significantly affected the capacity of ecosystems 
to provide important ecosystem services such as the prevention of soil 
erosion and maintenance of water quality in the creeks and rivers. The 
Lockyer Catchment is located 90 km west of Brisbane, Queensland’s 
capital, and comprises an area of 2,954 square kilometres, an average 
annual rainfall of 700–1200 mm and population of around 33,000. The 
Lockyer Catchment has a total length of streams of 2,062 kilometres and 
population of 33,331 (SEQRWQMST, 2001). It has a dry tropical 
climate with an average annual rainfall of 800 millimetres recorded 
between 1895 and 1995 (Rajbhandari, 2003). The catchment is 
composed of fertile farming land and is often referred to as the ‘salad 
bowl of South-East Queensland’. It is the key supplier of vegetables in 
Queensland and vegetable-growing contributes significantly to the 
economic base of the catchment (Boyes, 2001). 
The study area is a nested set of catchments which includes the Lockyer 
Catchment, Brisbane River and Moreton Bay Marine Area in South 
Eastern Queensland (Figure 14). The Lockyer Creek drains into the 
Brisbane River, and is thus part of the much larger Brisbane River 
Catchment. This in turn drains to Moreton Bay, a marine area semi-
enclosed by islands, which has other contributing rivers besides the 
Brisbane. This nested set of catchments is of interest because of the 
significance of on-site and off-site externality issues associated with 
ecosystem services, the ecological significance of the Moreton Bay and 
the Brisbane residents’ high value of environmental quality. 
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Figure 14: Lockyer, Brisbane River and Moreton Bay catchments 
 
 
Source: Sarker et al. (2008) 
Results 
Ecosystem health of the Lockyer Catchment  
The ecosystem health of the Lockyer Catchment is poor. It exhibits a 
low vegetation cover particularly along the riparian zone in combination 
with heavy soil erosion. Apan et al. (2002) describe the low vegetation 
cover in the Lockyer Catchment and demonstrate that within the period 
from 1973 to 1997, about 16,470 hectares of riparian woody vegetation 
was converted to pasture and the catchment currently has disconnected 
patches of vegetation. Before settlers came in the early to mid 1800s, the 
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catchment was rich with native vegetation and the riparian vegetation 
played an important role in trapping sediments during floods and rains 
(SEQRWQMST, 2001; Apan et al., 2002; Abal et al., 2005). At present, 
land clearing and land use practices have allowed sediments and 
nutrients to flow from the catchment into its creeks and adjacent water 
resources such as Brisbane River and Moreton Bay. Consequently, this 
has reduced biodiversity in the catchment and the health of aquatic 
ecosystems in the water resources.  
The water quality of the Brisbane River was viewed by many 
respondents as very low and the water quality of Moreton Bay 
unsatisfactory. One respondent said, ‘… water [in Brisbane River] is 
extremely polluted, nowhere can we see anything under the surface, it’s 
worrying’. The Ecosystem Health Report Cards released by Healthy 
Waterways (a collaborative organisation between the Queensland 
government, industry, researchers and the community) confirms the 
poor health of the ecosystem in the catchment, highlighting that the 
streams are in very poor condition, channel and gully erosion is 
widespread and sediment loads are significant during flood times in the 
catchment (MBWCP, 2006; 2005; 2004; 2003; 2001). The Report Cards 
also indicate that the catchment received extremely poor evaluations – 
ranging from F in 2001–2003 and D or D- in 2004–2006 (where D 
refers to ‘poor’ and F refers to ‘fail’). These findings suggest that 
regulations and control mechanisms employed by government agencies 
have had little success in preventing or solving the ecological problems 
in the catchment.  
The planning and management of ecosystems in the Lockyer Catchment 
The planning and management of ecosystems in the Lockyer Catchment 
is largely a political process, controlled by the Queensland Government 
and the Brisbane City Council, with issues entrenched within their 
bureaucratic structures and functions. One respondent said: 
‘environmental planning decisions are controlled by the Queensland 
Government and Brisbane council, with minimal consultation with 
community’. Another respondent added that ‘[community] consultations 
are fake, decisions are pre-determined … they only come to get support 
[of communities] for their decisions’. A number of discussions revealed 
that most government staff members are not interested in listening to 
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community voices, as they need to work according to the bureaucratic 
policy and targets set at higher levels. The diverse and often conflicting 
community voices are likely to delay their delivery of required 
performance according to their job description. One respondent said: ‘it 
is the system of bureaucracy where decisions are made by senior officials 
and politicians usually informed by science’. Another respondent added: 
‘if there is a problem, it is the problem of the system of bureaucracy’.  
The current approach to planning and management is simplistic. The 
complex interdependent relationships within and between different 
ecological and social systems have been simplified for technical and 
administrative convenience. Many respondents shared a belief that the 
planning and management approach of the government has overlooked 
the connections between a set of CPRs (such as groundwater and 
vegetation) that constitute the ecological richness of the catchment. The 
decisions that are made by the government experts are, as one 
respondent asserted, ‘driven by fixed resources, targets and 
predetermined policies, not according to the severity of the problems 
and the concerns of stakeholders’.  
Respondents from landholders, Healthy Waterways, officials of the 
Brisbane River and Moreton Bay, and private organisations are 
concerned about soil erosion, salinity and water quality issues perceived 
to have emerged from the damaging activities as mentioned above in the 
surrounding Lockyer Catchment. The approach adopted by the 
government is seen to be focussing on a single resource system in order 
to address on-site issues, ignoring the connection between different 
resources. Government interventions have mainly focussed on on-site 
problems identified by their staff, and if there are resources, they 
implement specific plans to solve them. One respondent claimed: 
‘resource management is much more complex as ecological and social 
processes overlap, but government approach has consistently failed to 
recognise this connection’. The simplified government approach has 
failed to tackle the issues of externalities of social and ecological 
interdependence.  
The current planning and management of resources has significantly 
damaged the environment and disengaged most community groups. For 
example, as one landholder said: ‘initially governments encouraged 
people to clear land and convert lands into agricultural fields, now we 
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face unsustainable situations’. The government has granted individual 
property rights to landholders as an approach to maximise the use of 
lands, with few restrictions on use. Although the land was cleared many 
years ago, one respondent said, ‘the current generation is suffering, most 
likely the future generation will suffer’. A common theme to emerge 
from the discussions and interviews was that land clearing has 
considerably worsened the problem not only in the area where the land 
was cleared but also in areas far from the cleared land. This is perhaps 
‘one of the most damaging policy interventions that the government has 
ever made’, one respondent highlighted. Soil erosion problems have 
reduced the level of ecosystem services and reduced the water quality for 
downstream users. Many respondents said that government has now 
started to restore ecosystems but the landholders are required to pay for 
correcting past government mistakes. The government is trying to 
manage the riparian buffer zone, but with limited consultation with the 
community groups. Many respondents remain discontented with the 
government’s exclusionary approach to the planning and management of 
the restored riparian zone.  
Regulating authorities have also employed market-based approaches to 
creating a market for ecosystem services. They attempted to divert 
payments for ecosystem services (PES) to the landholders so as to 
induce them to set aside productive farming lands to build up riparian 
buffer strips for producing the ecosystem services to improve water 
quality. While landholders are positive about this initiative, they doubt 
that the regulating authorities will be able to successfully execute the 
PES scheme because of the lack of collaboration among landholders and 
between landholders and other stakeholders to forego the lands to create 
a facilitating market framework where transactions for the payment for 
ecosystem services will occur. 
Stakeholders’ interests in collaborative planning and management 
All respondents shared a similar view that they are interested in 
collaborative work. As one respondent said: ‘natural resource planning 
and management is not possible by the governments or communities 
alone’. This was also the common answer to the question of why the 
government and stakeholders need to work together. Many respondent 
landholders, particularly from downstream Brisbane, had keen interests 
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in the management of resources in the upstream because they saw 
resource exploitation and agriculture activities in the catchment as the 
main sources of the downstream problems. Most respondents, including 
members from government agencies, private organisations and 
landholders, are now aware of the problems as well as the collaborative 
approach that could potentially solve them. International examples of 
success in collaborative resource management have also set examples for 
Lockyer stakeholders; as one respondent pointed out: ‘we have 
international examples of success in collaborative natural resource 
management, we can minimise mistakes and maximise success by 
learning from others’. International agreements that Australia has signed 
have also required collaborative approaches to natural resource 
governance, reflected in one respondent’s claim that ‘it is not the matter 
of choice, it is the requirement as Australia has already signed various 
agreements’. A common theme to emerge was that collaborative 
planning and management is not only possible, but is essential to 
improve social and ecological outcomes.  
A well-defined common space or a ‘collaborative platform’ is lacking. As 
one respondent said: ‘we are keen to work together, the difficulty is that 
there is no suitable platform to work together’. Another respondent 
highlighted the issues of equality, saying that ‘any collaborative decisions 
must be based on equality principles, everyone’s needs and voices are 
equally important’. Issues of power and resources vested in government 
officials were frequently raised by many stakeholders and as one 
respondent maintained: ‘the government agencies are current managers, 
they have the power and resources, they are well-situated to initiate 
collaborative work’. However, another respondent questioned such a 
critical role for the government: ‘the power and resources held with 
government agencies is also a risk for collaborative work, their role must 
change from decision makers to supporters for collaborative work’. 
Many respondents drew attention to the need for change in the expert 
attitude of the government agencies, and emphasised the need for a new 
participatory, flexible and inclusive culture to make collaborative 
planning a reality. A respondent also highlighted a critical need for 
community groups and businesses to prioritise the communal needs and 
problems, rather than individual benefits and losses in the process of 
consensus building through collaborative engagement. In general, 
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respondents were keen to become part of a collaborative process in 
ecosystem planning and management.  
Discussion  
The government has adopted an exclusionary, top-down and centralised 
approach together with some elements of a privatised/market-based 
approach in ecosystem planning and management practices which has 
had little success in delivering ecologically sustainable and socially 
desired outcomes. As demonstrated by the above findings, the 
ecosystem health has degraded due mostly to simplified, rational and 
exclusionary policy prescriptions that have led to adverse impacts on 
ecological processes and systems in the Lockyer Catchment. The 
regulating authorities have also neglected the complex interdependence 
between social and ecological processes. Despite enormous interest from 
all stakeholders to work towards the collaborative planning and 
management of natural resources, it has yet to be considered in the 
policy and practices. The questions to emerge then are: Why has the 
centralised approach persisted, despite delivering such negative 
ecological and social outcomes? And, how could collaborative planning 
and management be initiated and fostered?  
Why has centralised planning and management persisted? 
The finding from the case study demonstrates that there is little change 
in the way government agencies have conventionally planned and 
managed natural resources. Downs (1967) argues that the bureaucracy 
generally encourages bureaucrats to behave as avoiders of change. The 
centralised bureaucratic system of planning and management has 
avoided change and persisted over time due to its political, financial, 
technical and other backings. The centralised approach ensures that it is 
easy for the government agencies to make decisions unilaterally. The 
institutional efficiency of the government agencies is still being judged in 
terms of rational decision-making and protection of natural resources, 
rather than the management of collaborative actions. After the 
endorsement of various international agreements, however, the 
bureaucracy is now obliged to meet a range of social, economic and 
environmental objectives. For this, the agencies need to retain some key 
authority in which there is flexibility for community consultation and 
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some inclusions of community views, while more important decisions 
are made by the politicians and bureaucrats at the higher levels. This 
practice is also reflected in the maintenance of a culture supported by a 
controlling bureaucratic structure. As Ribot (2004) argues, the 
bureaucracy fears losing economic benefit from the control over natural 
resources and the power that defines and supports its political and 
administrative role. Institutional reform of the state agencies is often 
called institutional strengthening when much of the problem is that the 
institutions are already too strong (Fisher, 1994). The possibility of 
collaborative approaches does not appeal to the agencies because its 
assumptions for inclusive decision-making require the shift in functional 
assumptions underlying the government and bureaucracy as controller. 
Instead, custodial ideas about the government and bureaucracy making 
decisions for the people (often covertly) is a simple model for delivering 
quick results according to preset targets.  
The underlying reasons for the persistence of a centralised approach may 
also be due to bureaucratic norms and ideology. Weber (1958) argues 
that in a modern bureaucracy, the relationship between bureaucrats and 
clients are supposed to be functionally specific and impersonal. There is 
an existence of a bossy tradition in state bureaucracy in which 
subordinate staff must follow their boss’ order and the orders are 
hierarchically transmitted from top to the bottom. The order at the top 
is informed by an ideology for the maintenance of the bureaucracy to 
impose standards of social and environmental wellbeing. These vague 
concerns are often misguided from knowledge of orthodox science that 
identifies problems and devises solutions based on scientific methods 
which ignore social, economic, political and ecological contexts. 
Therefore, the problem is essentially ideological about how the 
bureaucracy is organised and operated.  
The analysis of findings from the Lockyer Catchment suggests that the 
decision-making is driven by the restricted thinking about resource 
planning and management that focuses on a single resource and the 
simple definition of relationships. This restricted thinking is linked to 
orthodox science which provides knowledge and skills to facilitate 
narrow understanding of problems and solutions. The knowledge 
produced by science has traditionally focussed on collecting politically 
neutral and accurate facts through quantitative and economic analyses of 
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problems. This knowledge informs policies because they are widely 
accepted in the policy circle. The historic practices of sampling and 
inference do not fully account for the social, political and ecological 
connections in which socio-ecological problems are experienced. The 
planning and policies were poorly informed; they could not address the 
issues situated in wider social, economic and political processes. And 
even when the policy has attempted to solve problems, it has been 
implemented through a universal and target-oriented model of the 
agencies which practically neglects the complex interdependence. The 
conventional power relations remain unchanged and the traditional 
bureaucratic planning and management maintains the status quo.  
Towards sustainability: collaborative planning and management of ecosystems 
Our findings suggest that stakeholders are keen to work together. This 
can be taken as a foundation for a collaborative approach to the 
planning and management of natural resources. Herein, we propose a 
relatively new CPR approach in establishing and fostering collaborative 
planning and management of ecosystems as CPR which, we believe, can 
enhance sustainability. Collaboration between various stakeholders for 
the Lockyer Catchment, Brisbane River and Moreton Bay can resolve 
various externality issues that arise in the catchment and marine areas. 
This is consistent with the vision of the Healthy Waterways Partnership, 
which notes: ‘By 2020, our waterways and catchments will be healthy 
ecosystems supporting the livelihoods and lifestyles of people in South 
East Queensland, and will be managed through collaboration between 
community, government and industry’ (Healthy Waterways, 2007: p. 13). 
This is also reflected in the view of integrated catchment management in 
Australia. As Syme et al. (1994) recommend, collaboration involving 
both the government and the community is crucial to develop and 
implement catchment planning and management. The importance of 
collaborative management is also supported by international experiences 
(e.g., Wittmer, 2005; Swallow et al., 2005; Kandel and Rosa, 2005). In 
addition, legal frameworks are vital for regulating and institutionalising 
the planning and management approach, and in Queensland a strong 
legal framework for catchment management needs to be established 
(Ewing, 2003).  
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The idea of collaborative management among users, which is also 
consistent with the literature on nested multiple use CPRs (e.g., Steins 
and Edwards, 1999), integrated catchment management (Syme et al., 
1994), and with the vision of the Healthy Waterways Partnership 
(Healthy Waterways 2007), is useful for understanding the issues of the 
wider socio-ecological interdependencies in which CPRs are embedded. 
A huge body of empirical literature on collaborative action provides 
examples for effective collaborative approaches that have addressed the 
issues emerging from social and ecological research to improve planning 
and management of CPRs (Cleaver, 2000; Ostrom, 2004; Shrestha, 
2005). The idea of collaborative planning and management is also useful 
for addressing management issues of natural systems, including 
catchments (German et al., 2006; Kerr, 2007). Other studies 
demonstrate that a collaborative management and planning approach is 
critically important in enhancing the collective action among different 
groups of stakeholders, especially for complex landscapes (Selin and 
Chavez, 1995; Lubell et al., 2002; Marshall, 2005). 
Figure 15: Collaborative planning and management of ecosystems 
 
Source: Authors 
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We propose a framework for planning and management of ecosystems 
in a catchment, as shown in Figure 15. It is proposed that both on-site 
and off-site users from the Lockyer Catchment, Brisbane and Moreton 
Bay can work together within an open and equal platform – i.e., a 
‘collaborative platform’ – coordinated by relevant government line 
agencies with non-government organisations, environmental groups, 
businesses enterprises and other stakeholders such as universities. 
Stakeholders could work together to identify issues, negotiate solutions, 
devise plans, and implement agreed-upon institutional arrangements to 
improve social and ecological outcomes and to internalise externalities 
rooted in socio-ecological interdependence. It is a multi-layered, multi-
stakeholder framework, adaptable to the needs of stakeholders and 
based on open, respectful communication and negotiation.  
In this framework, it is expected that stakeholders will be able to 
cooperate on multiple levels to correct issues of within-boundary and 
cross-boundary externalities and market failure. On-site users refer to 
those who are using groundwater and surface water in the catchment, 
while offsite users are downstream stakeholders including the authorities 
and managers of the Brisbane River and Moreton Bay, Healthy 
Waterways and private organisations. Cooperation among the on-site 
users of different CPRs addresses the externalities that occur within the 
catchment, while the cooperation between on-site and off-site users 
deals with the cross-boundary externalities that occur beyond the 
boundary of the catchment. In particular, cooperation between 
landholders and offsite beneficiaries can address cross-boundary 
externalities arising from land clearing and soil erosion in the Lockyer 
Catchment, affecting the water quality of the off-catchment water 
resources such as the Brisbane River and Moreton Bay.  
The framework is for CPR-based collaborative planning and 
management of ecosystems which can capture the merits of government 
and market-based approaches, bringing the technical and professional 
experiences into practice with those of other stakeholders. The process 
enhances the participation of stakeholders to improve ecosystem health, 
institutional development, community revitalisation and capacity 
strengthening. For instance, one initiative that the government is 
attempting to implement through top-down regulation and a market-
based instrument (PES scheme) for water quality improvement is the 
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construction of riparian buffer strips to prevent sediment flows from the 
catchment into the Brisbane River and Moreton Bay. The idea is useful, 
but since it requires landholders along the river to agree to forgo land 
and plant riparian vegetation, a high degree of collaboration among the 
stakeholders is essential. Furthermore, financing required for a PES 
scheme could also be arranged and structured through the collaboration 
between the buyers and sellers of ecosystem services. The beneficiaries 
would buy ecosystem services from the landholders, with the 
landholders acting as sellers.  
Although collaborative planning and management approaches have 
become popular in many countries to address various natural resource 
problems, and as we have argued, have the potential to do well 
compared to centralised or privatised systems in the specific context of 
our case study, we do not claim that this is the best framework to 
guarantee success in all areas. We cannot emphasise enough the need to 
refine this framework. We also recognise that effective collaboration is 
not easy. The critical role that we have recommended for the 
government agencies, as agreeing with one of our research participants, 
does pose a degree of risk because letting their power go within the 
collaborative approach is not what they are accustomed to.  
We are very much aware of the uncertainty involved in making decisions 
in a collaborative platform as we are still learning about how society and 
ecological systems work and interact. Therefore, our idea for a 
collaborative platform is that of a flexible, open and evolving forum for 
discussion and communication within the context of stakeholders’ own 
perceptions of conditions, problems and possible solutions for the 
present and future. The platform is about understanding, reflecting and 
synthesising ideas, problems and experiences to bring about change – 
the change that can only be possible with genuine interest, commitment 
and passion by involving stakeholders towards a common, concerted 
action for a better future. We agree with Ostrom et al. (2007) who 
asserted in relation to the CPR analysis that collaborative approaches are 
not a panacea. The approaches may, however, be applied as diagnostic 
tools for exploring natural resource problems and solutions for a 
sustainable future.  
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Conclusions 
The centralised and privatised planning and management of natural 
resources, which is still dominant in the Lockyer Catchment, has failed 
to internalise externalities that are inherent in the complex social and 
ecological interdependence. The centralised approach has delivered 
outcomes that are ecologically damaging and socially inappropriate and 
thus unsustainable. In addition, while the current planning and 
management approach attempts to improve ecological and social 
outcomes, the actual practice fails to do so. This failure necessitates the 
exploration of an alternative approach that has a potential to do better 
than the current one. A collaborative planning and management 
approach does have potential in the Lockyer Catchment, given that all 
stakeholders are interested in and willing to work together to improve 
social and ecological outcomes. An open, inclusive and equal 
‘collaborative platform’ has been proposed, with a critical role assigned 
to government agencies. It will be the task of these agencies to initiate, 
establish and foster an active and equitable collaborative platform where 
stakeholders can work together as equal partners – a major shift from 
what is currently happening.  
The centralised approach of planning and management of natural 
resources has persisted for a long time. A real shift from the centralised 
approach towards the collaborative approach can therefore be a slow 
and challenging process. A degree of resistance from the government 
agencies may prevent the platform from work effectively. A 
collaborative approach may not appeal to the agencies because its 
assumptions for inclusive decision-making require a fundamental shift in 
functional assumptions underlying the government and bureaucracy as 
controller. The centralised approach is also deeply embedded within a 
long tradition of bureaucratic culture, norms and ideology supported by 
strong, established and well-resourced structures, which encourage 
bureaucrats to behave as avoiders of change. A dominant discourse is 
informed by an ideology of the bureaucracy that must maintain standard 
and social and environmental wellbeing. These vague concerns are often 
misguided from knowledge of orthodox science that identifies problems 
and devises solutions based on scientific methods which ignore complex 
social, economic, political and ecological interdependence. 
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The possibility of a collaborative approach to originate and advance 
practice therefore depends heavily on understanding and addressing 
issues entrenched in the bureaucracy and how it has been established, 
organised and operated, as well as how it makes rational decisions based 
on scientific knowledge. Major rethinking is needed on the ideological 
and functional underpinnings of bureaucracy, and on modifying the role 
of governments as rational decision makers to political facilitators in 
order to initiate, maintain and institutionalise an effective collaborative 
platform in the planning and management of natural resources, one that 
can improve social and ecological outcomes and enhance sustainability. 
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